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  This paper formalizes a mechanism through which diversification in the production 
of research and development across firms located in a city dampens volatility in the local labor 
market, improves the incentives to perform research and development and smooths the 
aggregate business cycle fluctuations of a city. This is done by adapting the standard 
multisector quality ladder model (Grossman and Helpman, 1991) in order to allow for 
heterogeneity across firms, thus taking into account knowledge spillovers across 
heterogenous sectors, knowledge accumulation, pecuniary externalities and segmented labor 
markets. As a result, according to the local degree of diversification in research and 
development, sectoral technological shocks have an influence on the current choice of 
research and development and the location of production, and in turn on local business cycles 
and the life cycle of the city: diversification in research & development allows innovations in 
different sectors of the city to arrive at different points in time, thus avoiding to put pressure 
on the local labor markets and keeping wage discipline. This permits firms located in the city 
to perform enough research and development and possibly beat outside competition in 
discovering and manufacturing new products, thus growing (at the aggregate city level) 
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 1 Introduction1
Economic literature is replete with anecdotal evidence of the link between diversication in
production and volatility of the business cycle of a city. The latter would in turn have an
in
uence on the life cycle of the city: Brezis and Krugman (1997) refer to Bairoch (1985) to
make clear how the product life cycle may drive the life cycle of cities: \Old cities that remain
locked into traditional industries are shouldered aside by upstart cities that embody the new.
In time, of course, these upstarts are themselves often shouldered aside by yet newer urban
centers". Another quotation from the same authors makes a very important point relevant to
the present paper: \In some cases, cities |not huge cities like London and Paris, but smaller
cities with narrower export bases| appear to go through a life cycle of growth and decay".
These quotes stress that while cities go through booms and slumps of their life cycles depending
on the life cycle of their primal productions, larger and more diversied cities seem to be able to
avoid these unfortunate twists of fate. Krugman (1991) provides several examples of cities in the
United States which have gone through very severe recessions as their primal production became
obsolete: carpets in Dalton, tyres in Akron, the automotive industry in Detroit, and the steel
industry in Pittsburgh. Sometimes recessions have brought cities to (or close to) disappearance,
while other cities have managed to survive and nd some sort of resurrection. Analogous cases
have occurred in Europe as well (Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, Liege, Genoa, Taranto).
Anecdotal evidence aside, the empirical literature has also stressed the importance of the link
between sectoral shocks, industry displacement and employment volatility at the city level in
the US (Coulson, 1999; Carlino, DeFina and Sill, 2001).
These two pieces of evidence |that is the observed link between diversication and smoothed

uctuations (fact 1) and the link between sectoral shocks, industry displacement and employment
volatility (fact 2)| convey the idea that industry specic technological shocks trigger local
industry specic 
uctuations. These 
uctuations occur through displacement of industries across
locations (and countries) and imply volatility in local labor markets. The same industry specic

uctuations build up in aggregate business cycles at the city level, and the way they do crucially
depends on the diversication of activities within the city: more diversied cities enjoy steadier
growth paths and less pronounced business cycles.
Another two pieces of evidence motivate this paper. The rst one is that, in the real world,
research & development (henceforth R&D) intensities dier widely across industries with R&D
heavily concentrated in a few sectors of the economy (fact 3). This evidence is hard to conciliate
with the standard quality ladders model, where R&D eort is uniform across industries, since
demand for goods, production costs, and prots do not dier across industries, and investing in
R&D in any sector gives the same expected return. In the same class of models, moreover, any
co-movement of innovation processes across industry is precluded, since innovation processes
are independent and identically distributed across industries. The second piece of evidence is
provided by the debate on the eect on wages and employment in developed countries of trade
with labor abundant low wage developing countries (fact 4, Lawrence and Slaughter, 1993; Sachs
1I am grateful to Antonio Accetturo, Fabio Busetti, Giuseppe Carollo and Juri Marcucci, seminar participants
at NARSC 2007 (Savannah) and two referees from Temi di discussione for their comments. I am indebted to
Vincenzo Galasso, Marjorie Gassner, Michael Haliassos, Elhanan Helpman, Gianmarco Ottaviano, Dani Tsiddon,
Philippe Weil, Oved Yosha and seminar participants at Alghero, Buenos Aires, Bar Ilan, Pittsburgh, Roma (Ente
Einaudi), Salerno (CSEF) for providing comments on an earlier version, circulated with the title \Death and birth
of a city: The myth of the (Arabian) phoenix". All remaining errors are mine. The views expressed herein are
those of the author and not necessarily those of Bank of Italy.
5and Shatz, 1994; Dewatripont, Sapir, Sekkat, Guazzarotti and Lamorgese, 1998). Such debate {
originated in the early 90's by the rise of Asian tigers and recently revived by China and India's
steady growth { hinged upon the threat of job losses and increasing wage gaps between skilled
and unskilled workers in developed countries due to international competition by developing
countries, characterized by abundance of low paid workers. Such a fear might be rationalized
on the grounds that developed countries might be unable to nd a shelter from competition by
climbing the quality ladder, either because it might be too expensive to make it worthwhile, or
because international competitors might climb the ladder as well.
This paper formalizes one mechanism which provides a theoretical background to these four
pieces of evidence, based on the eect of diversication across rms and sectors in the production
of R&D. In a nutshell, innovation by a rm in a certain sector is a random variable distributed
according to a multivariate poisson process, whose arrival rate |i.e. the instantaneous prob-
ability of innovation| depends on rm-sector specic employment in R&D and a rm-sector
specic spillover from a common stock of knowledge. The lower the dispersion across rms and
sectors in the city of the distribution of the spillover, the smaller the diversication in R&D
and the more likely the event that more rms located in the city and active in dierent sec-
tors innovate at the same time. If this happens, larger current production in the sectors where
innovation has occurred comes at the cost of higher labor costs for R&D, less employment in
research and a lower probability of innovation in the future, lower competitiveness of a city's
products in the international markets, possible relocation of production out of the city and larger

uctuations in both city's aggregate business cycles and local labor market. The mechanism
through which all this action occurs is the well known negative intertemporal spillover which
characterizes all quality ladder models, although, in the present setting, its amplitude is made
explicitly dependent on diversication of R&D technology.
Technically the model adapts the standard multi-sector quality ladder model (Grossman
and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998) introducing three novelties. First, knowledge is
allowed to spread across sectors (borrowing from Romer, 1986). In the setting of this model this
buys the possibility of observing correlated innovation processes while preserving heterogeneity
across sectors (fact 3), and delivers an inverse relation between correlation in innovation processes
and diversication in R&D technology, and a formal link between such correlation, local growth
and local cycles (fact 1). Second, R&D technology is a concave function of R&D employment.
This implies that if production is displaced as a consequence of international competition and
workers are released, they might be not immediately reabsorbed in R&D, thus determining a
relation between correlation among innovation processes and volatility in the local labor market
(fact 2). Higher diversication and lower correlation go along with lower volatility, thus formally
representing Marshall's labor pooling economies.2 Third, labor markets are internationally
segmented, which allows the modeling of interaction with the labor abundant South (fact 4).
In the set-up of this model this implies that prots cease to be a constant mark-up on local
labor costs, and rms can forfeit their prots if correlated innovations impose a too harsh
wage pressure; at the same time expenditure becomes an endogenous variable and pecuniary
externalities arise, since higher wages command higher expenditure and higher production, thus
exacerbating the trade-o between (absence of) diversication and labor market volatility.
While nothing prevents using this model as a tool to analyze the link between product cycles
2In so doing this paper provides a simple theoretical example of the operating of Marshall's (1920) labor
pooling externalities in a growth model. Fujita and Ogawa (1982) and Hesley and Strange (1990) also provide a
formalization of such a kind of agglomeration economies, but they rather do it in a context of urban models in
order to analyze the spatial conguration of the city.
6and aggregate business cycles in larger agglomeration |such as regions and countries, the focus
on the city is more natural for two reasons. First, the link between average correlation among
innovation processes across sectors and diversication in R&D technology rests on the existence
of external economies and knowledge spillovers, whose diusion is thought as locally bounded
(Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). Second, the whole mechanism in the paper plays on the absence
of diversication, and even large cities are far more specialized than the smallest nations (Brezis
and Krugman, 1997).
The structure of the paper is as follows: section 2 contrasts the modeling choices taken in
this paper with previous literature. Section 3 builds the basic set up of the model. Section 4
obtains the equilibrium, while section 5 denes diversication within the city, and investigates the
mechanism through which diversication dampens the volatility of the equilibrium employment
in the city. Section 6 enables the basic set up to take into account two issues, namely learning by
doing and labor force heterogeneity. Section 7 wraps up the results of the paper and concludes.
2 The literature
In order to formalize the mechanism which generates diversication in the city and its linkages
with volatility in city growth and employment, this paper blends elements of growth theory,
business cycle theory, patent races, factor models, and risk-sharing in an original way. Leaving
aside the above mentioned innovations with respect to the standard quality ladder model, the
next paragraphs acknowledge similarities and dierences with previous literature.
This paper considers the link between diversication in R&D and local labor market 
uctu-
ations, which is a novelty with respect to the vast literature that has looked at the link between
sectoral diversication in production and volatility in local business cycle, in local labor mar-
kets and in the city's life cycle.3 This literature starts with Brezis and Krugman (1997), who
analyze cases where mature products tend to locate in established cities, while upstart products
locate in small and undiversied ones. The economic mechanism underlying such evolution is
that producers of established products improve their products relying on cross-sector knowledge
spillovers, so they value large and diversied cities and are able to sustain larger wage and rent
costs which are typical of those cities. New products springing from path-breaking innovations,
instead, develop in small and undiversied urban centers, since they do not enjoy signicant
spillovers from the bulk of old knowledge concentrated in large cities featuring larger crowding
costs.
Duranton and Puga (2001) analyze the relation between diversity of the sectoral composi-
tion of research in the city and innovation, pointing out that since innovation goes through a
costly process of trials and errors which takes advantage of diversication, while production of
the innovated products is favored by specialization, diversied and specialized cities coexist in
equilibrium, and there is a link between diversication and the life cycle of products. Such a
result is also achieved in this paper, through cross sector knowledge spillovers and probabilities
of improving upon the state of art quality which are heterogenous across sectors.
Duranton (2007) uses a rather standard quality ladder model to study innovation driven
displacement of industries across cities and confronts the predictions of such a model to the city
size distribution of the USA and France. Although his model also takes into account the fact
3Notice that although diversication in R&D and production are two distinct concepts, the latter is implied
by the former in the class of quality ladder models with drastic innovation |i.e. where the \winner" of the
innovation race \takes all" and serves the whole market.
7that the probability of innovation in one industry enjoys spillover from R&D eort in dierent
industries, it does not exploit the heterogeneity across industries. He also assumes that labor is
mobile across cities, thus preventing the analysis of the eect of wage pressure on local R&D,
and assumes some degree of inertia in the transfer of R&D knowledge across locations.4 As
in Duranton (2007, section V), the basic set-up of the present model also contemplates the
trade-o between agglomeration economies |introduced by the spillover in R&D activities|
and crowding costs {represented by the general equilibrium eect in the labor market.
An example of models where cross-industries diversication in R&D technology is allowed is
Scott Taylor (1993), but unlike the present paper, his innovation processes are independent and
identically distributed across sectors and there are no cross-sectors spillovers.
The interaction among sectors in the city, that in the present paper is achieved through
competition in the labor market, has been recently analyzed by Dinopoulos and Segerstrom
(2006), in a dierent context, in which the outside world (the South in the authors' notation)
can imitate innovations achieved in the city (the North) but never innovates.
Finally, the factor structure outlined in section 3.4 is close in spirit to the one used in Ballester,
Calv o-Armengol and Zenou (2006) to analyze networks among agents, as well as to the one used
in Forni and Reichlin (2001) to analyze the scope of risk-sharing among EU regions and US
states.
3 The basic set up
3.1 Quality ladders
I consider an economy with a continuum of industries indexed by j 2 [0;1]. In each industry the
good can be produced in an innity of dierent qualities, indexed by m, where m is an integer.
Each dierent quality provides a dierent 
ow of consumption services (qm(j)), and each new
quality embodies a leap of  > 1 upon the previous quality. Hence, qm(j) = qm 1(j) for each
m; j. To discover the new quality entrepreneurs have to engage into an R&D race which is
characterized later on (section 3.4).
3.2 Preferences and demand
The economy is populated by a unit continuum of households. Each household lives only one
period, supplies her labor in exchange for wage (w), and enjoys utility outpouring from con-
sumption and leisure.5 Marginal disutility to work (or utility coming from leisure) is constant
and equal to a. Consumers evaluate all qualities of all consumption goods according to the
following utility function
Ut = logD(t)   al (1)
4Technically he assumes that \quality improvement in an industry requires the knowledge associated with the
leading quality. In turn this knowledge is available only to research rms located in the same city as the industry
leader".
5I assume the worker to be short-lived because I want to condition out the intertemporal choice of consumption
and expectations about future stochastic income. In such a way I completely cut o consumption smoothing
through saving/dissaving, and I focus solely on income/consumption smoothing via the choice of settlement.
Alternatively, a myopic consumer only evaluating current consumption or non storable income would do the job.
But I do not consider these latter hypotheses to be more realistic than the one I have adopted here.
8where l is the fraction of the time endowment spent working (limited from above by  L), and










This denition of consumers' preferences delivers that i) consumption goods are substitutes with
unit elasticity of substitution, and that ii) qualities of the same consumption good are perfect
substitutes, maintaining that better qualities provide higher utility and are therefore preferred.6
Each cohort of consumers at time t exchanges labor services for wages. Labor is homogeneous:
a worker can indierently work in the productive or in the research department of a rm, and
she receives the same wage. Since labor market is assumed to be perfectly competitive, any







dj  wt; (3)
where wt is the wage paid to both researchers and manufacturing workers. Since all qualities
are perfect substitutes, only the quality carrying the lowest quality adjusted price (call it ~ m) is
demanded at the optimum. Since all goods are weighted in the same way, expenditure does not
change across goods, and the consumer spreads expenditure evenly across all goods. Individual
demand for each good is then
xmt(j) =
(
Et=pmt(j) form = ~ mt(j)
0 otherwise:
(4)
Finally, at the optimum each household supplies one unit of labor, provided that the real
wage is not smaller than the marginal disutility to work.7
3.3 Production
I will assume the following simplifying hypotheses: i) the economy is constituted by only two
locations, one city and the outside world,8 and ii) the outside world is modeled as a unique
location competing against the entrepreneurs both on the grounds of discovering a new quality
of the nal good and of selling it to consumers.
In each location a unit continuum of industries is represented (indexed according to the good
produced). In each industry in each location a unit continuum of entrepreneurs is located,
indexed by i 2 [0;1]. All entrepreneurs perform R&D to discover a new quality of the good
produced in the industry. Once discovered, the new quality is uniquely produced by its inventor,
who stops performing R&D because of the \replacement eect" (Grossman and Helpman, 1991;
Reinganum, 1983). In each industry rms (or entrepreneurs) compete on price (against both
other local entrepreneurs and the outside world). Each rm can produce any quality except the
6Notice that leisure is not a substitute for any of the consumption goods.
7The condition is wt=[p(t)D(t)]  a where p(t) is a price index for the composite good. Let w be the minimum
wage for which this condition holds.
8Ideally one should consider several dierent locations in the economy, and model symmetrically the way
external demand is formed. Here I decided to keep the model simple and ignored this issue, since the economy
being considered is spaceless and third country eects do not play any crucial role (Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano
and Tabuchi, 2005; Behrens, Lamorgese, Ottaviano and Tabuchi, 2007).
9state of art, which is only produced by the inventor.9 One unit of labor allows to produce one
unit of any quality of any consumption good.10
Since j is just a label for the industry, one can sort the industries such that  2 [0;1] is the
mass of products manufactured in the city, and 1    is the mass of products produced outside
the city.
Competition drives the price of a unit of the previous quality down to the marginal cost of the
cheapest competitor w = w0.11 The producer of the state of the art quality provides a product 
times as good as the previous quality and imposes a price up to  times as large as the marginal
cost. Given the shape of the demand function (4) and consumer preferences, the leader does not
impose any price higher than w0, because demand, sales and prots would be nil. Similarly
she does not lower the price discretely under w0 because given the unit price elasticity of (4),
she would not reap any additional revenue by so doing. But total labor compensation would
be larger and the leader would make smaller operative prots. The leader's optimal response
to the follower imposing a price w0 is therefore to set a price a shade below w0 and serve the
whole market given constant returns to scale in production.
On the other hand the follower's optimal response to the leader setting the price equal to
w0 is to impose price equal to w0. In fact for any price pF  w0 s/he reaps zero prots, for
any pF < w0 s/he makes operating losses.12 Making null prots drives the followers out of the
market.
Summarizing, equilibrium prices, quantities and prots are:13





X ~ m; F(j) = 0; (6)
where X ~ m(j) is the world aggregate demand accruing to the producer of good j in the city. Since
the top quality of the good in all sectors j receive the same amount of expenditure, X ~ m(j) = X ~ m
and (j) =  for all j.
3.4 R&D: the technological race
Firms compete for technological leadership against other rms within the same sector and against
the outside world. Technological leadership grants temporary monopoly rents. They are tem-
porary since, due to the random process of innovation, the time during which the leader reaps
the rent is also a random variable, and obsolescence and leapfrogging are granted. This is what
this literature means by creative destruction.
9Due to the use of a memoryless poisson R&D technology and total disclosure of the patent, which are
standard hypotheses in this literature (Grossman and Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998), each researcher
nds it more convenient to build upon someone else's invention rather than try to imitate and produce the same
quality. The former strategy is rewarded with expected monopolistic gains while the latter just delivers zero
prots (Nash-Bertrand price competition) for both incumbent and imitator.
10Assuming the slope of the linear production function to be dierent from 1 does not change the results.
11I assume that labor is not a scarce resource outside the city, so that the wage paid outside the city is w
F.
In order to guarantee the existence of the equilibrium, it is useful to call w
H the wage level at which demand for
workers in R&D exceeds the number of workers in the city, and let w0 = minfw
H;w
Fg > w.
12In fact the equilibrium price level the follower sets is not unique. Any price higher than w0 is still an
equilibrium, in that the follower cannot improve her/his situation by deviating. Since any price higher than w0
grants the same null prots, all these equilibria are pay-o equivalents and one can only focus on pF = w0.
13Notice that the wage paid to workers is not constrained to be the same across all locations. Shortage of labor
may drive wages upward, which is exactly all what Marshall's (1920) local economies are about.
10The outside world produces innovations in sector j according to a random process, namely a
Poisson( j) with j 2 [0;1]. Analogously, for rms within the city, innovation is a random event
which occurs according to a Poisson law with arrival rate ij. As usual in this setting the arrival
rate is equal to the instantaneous probability of success: that is, a rm which exerts an eort
ij in research activity has a positive probability ij of success at each point in time dt. In case
of success the rm is able to produce the improved quality |which provides  times as many
consumption services as the previous quality, serves all the market, and reaps prots equal to
L until a new improved quality is invented.14 With probability 1   ijdt at each dt the rm
does not achieve the innovation and its production, sales and prots stay equal to zero.
3.4.1 R&D technology, diversication in R&D and correlated innovation
In order to account for externalities in the R&D activity and correlation in the innovation
processes, this paper departs from the standard quality ladder model. Along this endeavor it is
convenient to suppose that research eort ij is made of two dierent components
ij = ij + ij; (7)
where ij is the idiosyncratic component of the research eort and ij is the common component.
The former depends on the number of researchers ij employed by rm i in sector j through
an increasing and concave function ij( ) which can be rm-specic, namely ij = ij(ij); the
latter is the product of a rm-sector specic loading ij and a Romer's (1986) style common
stock of knowledge, which is just a weighted average of idiosyncratic research eorts with weights





The factor loadings ij give a measure of how much rm i in sector j of the city is able to
take advantage of the common shock, and has a generic distribution G() over all rms in all
sectors in the city.
This structure re
ects the idea that innovation is partly due to the idiosyncratic R&D eort
that one rm exerts, and partly to spillovers from other rms' own idiosyncratic research eort,
which is a standard feature of endogenous growth models based on increasing returns external to
the rm (Romer, 1986). Spillovers are due to the fact that idiosyncratic research eort exerted
by a certain rm in a certain sector enters other rms' research eort through the common stock
of knowledge.
This setting is very general in that it allows for a very complex structure of correlation of
the innovation processes and, by specifying opportunely the weights !ij, for a decay of the
knowledge spillover. For instance, research intensity in the cell ij could be due to a world
common factor, a sector specic factor common to all cities, a city specic factor common to all
sectors within the city, and a sector factor specic for the city; alternatively the city common
factor might instead be a weighted average of the research intensity of all cities with weights
strongly decreasing as the distance increases; even further, the sector common factor might be
14The period during which the leader reaps monopoly prots is random as well: waiting time for the next
innovation is distributed according to a negative exponential of parameter ij +  j, that is a  (1;ij +  j).
15Formally, innovation for rm i in sector j of the city is a random variable Zij obtained as the sum of a
common component ij and an idiosyncratic component zij. zij is a random variable distributed as a i.i.d.
Poisson with arrival rate ij, while ij is the product of a loading ij and a weighted average of i.i.d. poisson




j !ij zij(ij)didj with weights !ij. By the properties of aggregation of i.i.d.




j !ij ijdidj, while Zij is
distributed as a multivariate poisson with arrival rate ij = ij + ij (Johnson and Kots, 1969, page 298).
11a weighted average of the research intensities of all other sectors with weights decreasing along
the economic distance across sectors (measured according to some metrics, for instance the one
in Conley and Dupor, 2003; Lamorgese and Ottaviano, 2007).
Since each entrepreneur can set up a research plant in any sector, because there is no xed
cost of setting up a research plant and there is only one type of labor, for the remainder of the
paper it will be assumed that all rms in all sectors have the same idiosyncratic R&D technology
ij(ij) = (ij), whereas their optimal choice of employment in R&D may vary. It will also
be assumed that the each rm's idiosyncratic R&D contributes equally to the common stock
of knowledge, i.e. !ij = !, and such contribution will be normalized to 1. Beyond a huge
simplication of the algebra, such hypotheses are not needed for any of the results of the paper
to hold.
The departure from standard quality ladders through the introduction of the factor structure
in the innovation process and the knowledge spillover delivers the main result of the paper, that
is it allows to obtain an explicit link between average correlation among innovations across rms
in the city and the moments of the distribution G(), which controls the amount of diversica-
tion in R&D technology. In particular, diversication for R&D technology described by equation
(7) depends on the variance of the distribution G(); diversication is minimal if G() is de-
generate and ij = , and maximal for G() uniform over a support [;]. In the latter case
spillovers from the common stock of knowledge are are rm/sector specic, so diversication is
maximal, while in the former case all rms in all sectors receive the same spillover, so diversi-
cation is minimal. Finally, the mean of G() controls the relative weight of the common and
idiosyncratic components of the research eort: if the common component counts little because
the mean of ij is small, on average a small variance of the distribution has a modest in
uence
on diversication.16 In section 5 I'll show that, at the equilibrium, increased average correlation
in innovation delivers on average more innovation, a larger share of manufacturing goods ()
being produced in the city and a stronger wage pressure that discourages R&D, which jointly
with random innovation creates 
uctuations of the aggregate city business cycle.17
An informal analysis of sectoral comovement based on pairwise correlation among innovation
in dierent sectors provides a nice intuition about the driving forces underlying the link between
diversication and equilibrium R&D employment. The covariance among any pair of random
variables Zij describing discovery of rm i in sector j is a function of the common stock of
knowledge () and the loadings of the two cells (sectors/rm) (ij) (Johnson and Kots, 1969,
page 298),
cov(Zij;Zsn) = ij sn : (8)




ij  + ij)1=2(2
sn  + sn)1=2 (9)
16Diversication among discovery processes is also maximal in the standard quality ladder model, since random
discovery processes are independent across sectors, hence there is zero correlation among discoveries, and contem-
poraneous innovation is an event with zero probability measure, i.e. it only happens by accident (Grossman and
Helpman, 1991; Aghion and Howitt, 1998).
17However even in a standard quality ladder model without cross-sector spillovers in R&D technologies, upward
wage pressure can be produced even if discovery processes are uncorrelated. Sequential innovation is enough: if
at time t the share of sectors producing in the city is  and a rm innovates in another sector, without any of the
existing sectors shutting down,  increases to 
0 and excess demand of labor drives wage up (Lamorgese, 2001).
12Both pairwise covariance and pairwise correlation among innovations in rms belonging to
two dierent sectors are increasing in the loadings of the common stock of knowledge.
However, the relevant notion of diversication in this setting is average correlation among all
rms in all sectors in the city, which is a weighted average of (9) using the distribution of the
's as weighting scheme. I call this statistics (Z). Appendix A3 shows that, using the Taylor
expansion around the average of G(), average correlation can be approximated as a function
decreasing linearly with the variance of the distribution of the 's, with the intercept and the
slope increasing in the average . Formally
(Z) ' ( )   K( )var(): (10)
with ( ) > 0, K( ) > 0, ( )  > 0 and K( )  > 0, where ( ) and K( ) are functions of
average ij, average ij and  (see appendix A3 for a formal denition).
It is possible to show that an increase in the variance of the distribution of ij increases
the average pairwise correlation across sectors, while the eect of an increase in the average of
G() has an overall negative eect on average correlation, determined by a direct positive eect
and an indirect negative eect. The intuition behind such eects is the following: the larger
the variance of the distribution of the 's, the more dierent the weights across sectors and the
smaller the average correlation among the innovation processes across sectors. An increase in
the average has a positive direct eect since the common factor becomes larger, and a negative
eect since, as the average  increases, the weight of the variance term in (10) also increases.18
All in all, the eect of an increase in both the rst two moments of the distribution of the 's
implies a lower probability that innovation occurs contemporaneously in dierent sectors in a
small time interval. The increase of heterogeneity in  and therefore on diversication has an
eect on the equilibrium of this economy. Before analyzing it in section 5, I need to determine
the characteristics of the equilibrium. This task is accomplished in section 4.
3.4.2 The market for patents
Let vij be the value of the patent rm i obtains when innovating in sector j.19 At each point in
time, any rm (i) can perform research activity in sector j and attain a value vij with probability
ij by performing a certain idiosyncratic research eort (ij). To exert ij the entrepreneur has
to hire ij workers, while she has to hire just one worker to produce one unit of the improved
quality. Heterogeneity across rms and sectors in the ability to enjoy general purpose technology
(ij) and heterogeneity across sectors in the outside competition in the innovation race ( j)
implies that the value of the patent is heterogenous across rms and sectors, unlike Grossman
and Helpman (1991).
18The overall eect is negative if the variance of the distribution of 's is large enough, that is if var() >
1=(3).
19Grossman and Helpman (1991) assume v as the stock market value of the rm. Since the focus of this
paper is on diversication as risk-sharing device, it is more careful to talk about market value of the patent and
market for a patent. If there were a stock market, if it were complete (non arbitrage condition), and access were
unrestrained to any operator, workers would be able to smooth unemployment risk away via the stock market,
as well as rms would be able to smooth the risk of being leapfrogged in the technological race. All is needed
here is a resale value for the rm (a safe outside option), an expected prot and a capital gain, with the patent
value depending on the latter two. Since the market for patents is highly competitive it has a sense to impose an
arbitrage condition. Alternatively one can think of a complete stock market to which workers do not have access.
Since prots are not distributed, workers do not have access to the stock market, not even indirectly through
rms' ownership. Hence, rms are able to smooth away all risk, workers are not.
13The dynamics of vij is characterized through the usual arbitrage equation, which compares
revenues of the alternative investment strategies available to the entrepreneur, modied to take
heterogeneity in vij into account. The expected gain of the leader at each period dt is equal to
the expected prot from being a leader () plus the capital gain of its investment (_ vij) which is
earned if no one else has innovated (which happens with probability 1  (j + j)dt), minus the
loss of the patent value if someone else in the city or outside innovates in sector j in dt (which
happens with probability j +  j), where j =
R 1
0 ijdi is the aggregate research eort in sector
j in the city.20 Therefore the expected gain of the leader is:
dt + _ vijdt[1   (j +  j)dt]   vij(j +  j)dt (11)
neglecting 2nd order eects, it becomes
[ + _ vij   (j +  j)vij]dt (12)
which at each dt has to be equal to the return on an outside safe investment
 + _ vij   (j +  j)vij = rvij (13)
_ vij
vij





In this economy the equilibrium is a set of values for the vector (w;ij;vij;x;p) for given , and
a distribution for the random variable , such that i) each R&D rm optimally chooses research
employment to maximize the value of the patent, ii) each manufacturing rm maximizes prots
(section 3.3), and iii) all markets (the one for nal goods, the one for patents and the one for
labor) clear. Sections 4.1 to 4.4 analyze in turn with such issues, while section 4.5 gives the
intuition of the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, whose formal proof is conned in
appendix A1.
4.1 Optimal R&D eort
The entrepreneur exerts the research eort in order to be able to enjoy the economic value vij of
the patent she obtains. The optimal R&D eort schedule is recovered by choosing employment
in research optimally to maximise vijij(ij)dt   wijdt. Hence, for each rm and sector
@ij(ij)
@ij
= w=vij; 8i;j (15)
implicitly denes an optimal value of ij and ij for each value of vij given w, for each rm in
each sector.
20Notice that probability of continuation is lower than in Grossman and Helpman (1991), and probability of
being leapfrogged is higher when the outside world can innovate as well and the latter event is independent of the
innovation in the city. Notice also that if the discovery rate of the outside competitor increases |i.e. its R&D
technology becomes more productive, in equilibrium the idiosyncratic research eort of the entrepreneur in the
city is lower as well as the value of the patent s/he detains.
14As long as each rm neglects the spillovers coming from other rms research, (15) becomes
@(ij)
@ij
= w=vij; 8i;j (16)
which implicitly denes, for each rm in each sector, the optimal level of research employment
ij depending on the value of the patent vij; the exact values of both are pinned down by the
equilibrium in the market for patents.
4.2 Final goods markets clearing
The optimal quantity produced by each leader is given by (5). The demand she faces is given
by the demand expressed by all the consumers who are employed in research (inside and outside
the city) plus the demand expressed by all those employed in manufacturing (inside and outside





















































0 ijdidj. Neglecting the index for the best quality,
X =
w + w0
(   1 + ) w0    w
for all j 2 [0;1]; (18)
where I have assumed that R&D employment outside the city is  |that is, in the outside world
 researchers are hired to exert a R&D eort  j =  j(), and I have imposed Xs = Xd = X.21
As a consequence, using (6) one gets
 =
(w0   w)(w + w0)
(   1 + ) w0    w
; for all j 2 [0;1]: (19)
4.3 Patents market clearing
Equilibrium values for ij, vij and then ij are determined by the interaction between optimal
eort in R&D (eq. (15)) and the equation describing the dynamics of the market value for the
patent of newly invented quality (eq. (14)).
21Notice that production is positive since the denominator (   1 + )w0   w is always positive for w < ^ w,
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V
Figure 1: Optimal R&D eort and patent value
The equilibrium values of eort in R&D and patent value of the innovation are determined by
the intersections between the two loci V V (obtained from (14) with _ vij=vij = 0 and Vij = 1=vij)







j(ij) = jV   (r +  j)
(20)
Since R&D spillover is neglected by the rm when choosing optimal spillovers and each en-







(ij) = Vij   (r +  j +  j)
(21)
where  j = ij +
R
p6=i[pj + (pj)]dp is taken as a constant by the single entrepreneur. Equi-
librium is depicted as point E0 in gure 1.
A condition implicitly dening 
ij and V 
ij, useful for comparative statics, can be obtained
substituting the rst equation into the second one, and inverting ( ). 






(w0   w)ij 
(   1 + )w0    w
+
(w0   w)Vijw0
(   1 + )w0    w
  (r +  j +  j)
#
(22)
22Using (15) one obtains @(

ij)=@Vij = ijw= < 0, that is  is downward sloping in the (Vij;ij) space.
V V (the _ vij = 0 locus) is an upward sloping line in the same space (from (14)).
23This assumption means that i) the entrepreneur assumes as given the stock of general purpose knowledge
(), while ii) she takes for given the contribution of all other agents aggregate sector j R&D eort
R
p6=i (pj)dp
and iii) she consider its contribution (ij) to it non negligible. This assumption allows the heterogeneity in R&D






4.4 Labor market clearing
Labor supply in the city is xed at  L.24 Since labor is indierently used in both research and
manufacturing, total labor demand in the city is the sum of demand for labor expressed by all
the rms active in all sectors both in manufacturing and research. Employment in research is





ijdidj. Employment in manufacturing is equal to the sum of equilibrium




X ~ m(j)dj =(w) + X(w) =  L
and substituting  in (18)
 + 
w + w0
(   1 + )w0   w
= L: (23)
4.5 Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
The existence of an equilibrium in this economy can be veried by making sure that the labor
market clears, i.e. that the two schedules X(w) and  L (w) cross at least once in the (w;L)
plan, within the set of admissible wage levels [w0;w0]. The rst part of appendix A1 shows
that the existence of the equilibrium is always guaranteed in this setting by showing that X(w)
always exceeds  L   (w) at the minimum wage and is exceeded at the maximum wage.
Uniqueness also requires conditions on the relative slope and concavity of the two schedules.
Whereas is it always possible to show that  L   (w) slopes positively and to give reasonable
conditions under which the slope of X(w) is determined, in the general case the conditions for
which the concavity of both schedules is determined bear little economic meaning.25
For the remainder of the paper, it is assumed that the idiosyncratic component of R&D
technology is equal to () = log(), which assures uniqueness of the equilibrium within the
admissible wage range, as depicted in gure 2. The second part of appendix A1 gives a formal
proof of uniqueness of the equilibrium.
5 Discovery of new qualities, dynamics of the market share and
diversication
So far the paper has established a formal relation between the moments of the distribution G()
and average correlation among innovation processes (section 3.4.1) and been showed that this
economy admits one equilibrium for given  (section 4). In this section I reap the main result
of the paper, that is I analyze the eect of an increase in diversication in R&D technology
24Labor supply is indeed
R 1
0
 L dh for w  w; and 0 otherwise.
25Still in the general case, uniqueness and stability of the equilibrium are assured at least in a subregion of the
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in the labor market
on the equilibrium local employment and output; in so doing, I am able to assess the eect of
increase in diversication in R&D technology on the volatility of the local labor market and the
city aggregate business cycle.
Before achieving this result, I need to establish an intermediate result, that is I need to
assess the eect on the equilibrium of an exogenous change |triggered by the relocation of
production between the city and the outside world| in the share of production in the city ,
which so far as been taken as given.26 Although this exercise gives the reader the 
avor of
the mechanisms triggered by a change in the share  of production in the city, a caveat needs
to be taken in account: the share  of production in the city in this setting is not exogenous,
but it is endogenously determined by the equilibrium values of ij given  L, ,  and  j and
the randomness of innovation, which is the engine of the whole process of industry relocation
and depends on R&D employment.27 Should the focus be long-run growth, the model should
therefore be solved dynamically taking  as endogenous;28 since here I am only interested in
the eect of diversication in R&D on short-run 
uctuations of output and employment, I can
safely consider  as exogenously given.
Starting from an equilibrium of this economy, with w = w1 and  = 1, I suppose that
26I only consider the case in which innovation drives up the share of production in the city |the case of a
drop of  being symmetrical.
27Random innovation feeds the economy with random shocks |i.e. the discovery of a new quality| at
random intervals: if discovery occurs in a sector which was not producing in the city, an entrepreneur sets up a
manufacturing rm, and this induces endogenous increase in ; if it occurs in a sector already producing in the
city, the new manufacturer just replaces the old one and  is unchanged; if, nally, the innovation is achieved by
rms in the outside world in a sector whose production takes place in the city  decreases.
28If the endogeneity of the local share of production is taken into account,  turns out to evolve as a Markov
process with a continuous state space. Preliminary results of a simpler set-up with up to four sectors (states) and
a unit mass of rms in each sector suggest that the distribution of  is ergodic and convergence to the ergodic














Figure 3: Change in the local share of production and equilibrium in the labor market
an entrepreneur located in the city discovers a new quality in an industry which is currently
producing outside the city, thus making  increase from 1 to 2.
On the spot, for given w = w1, prots increase and so also does the incentive to perform R&D,
thus causing the demand for researchers to increase (@=@ > 0, by lemma 1, in appendix A2).
Aggregate demand for nal goods increases as a consequence, since there is a larger demand
for goods from an increased number of R&D employees, and by a larger number of rms in
production. Labor demand in turn increases through three channels, i.e. i) increased demand
for researchers (i.e. in increase in  in  +  X); ii) increased demand for manufacturers, since
more rms are producing in the city (i.e. an increase in ); and iii) increased demand for
manufacturers, since more researchers and more producers are demanding more goods which
need to be produced (i.e. an increase in X). Such changes aect both the LHS and the RHS of
the equilibrium condition in the labor market, namely X(w) is shifted up, while L   (w) is
shifted down (see gure 3).
At wage w1 labor demand exceeds labor supply, thus driving wages upward and restoring a
new equilibrium at an higher wage through a reduction of employment in research (by equation
(37)), and an increase of employment in production (by equation (35)).
I am now ready to analyze the eect of an increase in diversication in R&D technology on
the equilibrium local employment and output.
In section 3.4.1 a formal relationship has been derived between the moments of the distribu-
tion of the 's, which proxy the degree of diversication in R&D in the city, and the average
correlation among innovation processes. According to it, the more (less) dispersed G(), the
higher (lower) the diversication in R&D technology, and the lower (higher) average correlation
among innovation processes in the city.
Turning to the eects of diversication in R&D on the equilibrium, a lower (higher) average
correlation in innovation processes induces a smaller (larger) number of innovations within the
unit of time, a smaller (larger) share of production located in the city, a smaller (larger) pressure
19on wages, and a smaller (larger) crowding out of R&D employment by employment in production;
less (more) crowding out induces in turn a larger (smaller) probability of innovation of local
R&D activity and higher (lower) future competitiveness of city products. Finally, more (less)
diversication in R&D technology along with a smaller (larger) number of contemporaneous
innovations induces less (more) volatility in employment and in the production share in the
city.29
6 Extensions
In this section two further issues are tackled within the framework of this model. Section
6.1 shows how to integrate learning by doing and knowledge accumulation in the model; in
so doing the trade-o between diversication and labor market 
uctuations is less severe and
specialization arises in the model. Section 6.2 extends the main results of the model to a case
where there exist two labor factors (skilled and unskilled labor) featuring dierent degrees of
intercity mobility.
6.1 Learning by doing and specialization
So far the model predicts that both workers and entrepreneurs prefer more diversication. This
could be seen as contradicting empirical evidence which suggests a pattern of concentration and
specialization depending on the stage of the life cycle: specialization would be a characteristic of
the early stages of the life cycle of a city, whereas diversication would prevail in mature cities
(Glaeser, Kallal, Scheinkman and Shleifer, 1992).
Specialization can be accounted for in this model considering that innovation becomes tougher
and tougher to achieve the further the technological frontier is pushed (Segerstrom, 1998, for an
analogous treatment of the technological frontier). This is obtained posing
 = (h;); 1 > 0;2 > 0;11 < 0;22 < 0 (24)
where h is the state of art and  is the number of workers. Research intensity is increasing in
the state of art and the number of researchers employed, but productivity is decreasing in both
arguments. State of the art is specic to the sector in which is accumulated. State of the art
accumulates while performing research, but the more advanced the state of the art, the slower
the accumulation, that is
_ h = (h;)   
h:
Each rm decides the employment of researchers |which still are undistinguished from man-
ufacturing workers| solving the following dynamic problem:
29It is also possible to show that less (more) technological diversication induces smaller (larger) growth rates
of output (as in Aghion and Howitt, 1992): when the production share increases, production crowds out research;
when production shares decreases because of leapfrogging, and R&D's reward is high from an individual point
of view, rms anticipate that the large research eort induced by larger individual investment and a large cross
sector spillover shortens the period during which monopoly prots are reaped, and invest less. This way one









s.t. _ h = (h;)   
h (26)
h0 = 0 = 0: (27)
The Hamiltonian of the problem and the set of rst order conditions are (hereafter, I will neglect
time indexes)
H = v   w + (   
h) (28)




Hh =  _ ;  _  = vh   
 ) _  = 
   vh (30)
to which (26) has to be added.30 To guarantee asymptotic stationarity, one must choose the














These equations teach two lessons of the model. First, depending on the past history of
research eort, the level of the state of the art increases (equation (31)). This has a negative
eect on h (hh < 0) and through (32) on .  increases as a consequence, and by the concavity
on the R&D technology in both the arguments delivers smaller demand for researchers in the
equilibrium. As long as the state of the art becomes more complex (the technology becomes
more mature) rms want to employ less researchers. The gain from invention decreases to the
point that it is less convenient to perform research in that sector. Second, when technology is
still young, the state of the art is low, the productivity of h in R&D is high,  is high,  is low
and more researchers are demanded by each rm. As long as the state of the art is not very well
developed it is very convenient to perform research and rms bid up to hire researchers, which
is the only input of R&D they can change discretely.
These considerations have a consequence on the dynamics of employment and wages in the
local market and feed back on the incentive to perform research in the city. As h is low, each rm
wants to employ more researchers and this boosts aggregate employment in research, reducing
the size of the idle labor force and squeezing the room for another sector to invent and produce
in the city. Firms of another sector anticipate that labor demand is too high in the city for them
to take advantage from settling in. On the other hand, there is no spillover to catch, therefore
from their viewpoint there is no advantage in choosing that site to produce. The city ends up
being specialized in the young technology.
30Second order conditions can be shown to be veried using (24) and the Mangasarian's (1966) conditions.
31Notice that (29) describe the demand for researchers on the local labor market, and it is well behaved. It
turns out to be decreasing in wages and increasing in the market value of the patent of the hiring rm: rms hire
less researchers if their wage increases, but they hire more of them when the perception of the market value of
the patent detained is larger.
21As long as the technology becomes mature, h increases, the incentives to hire researcher slow
down. Employment in the city decreases and this eventually creates enough room for another
sector to settle in and perform research. Cities featuring mature technologies end up being more
diversied than cities featuring upstart new technologies.
6.2 Skilled vs. unskilled workers
The trade o between specialization and 
uctuations is also mitigated by the consideration of
two dierent kinds of labor, skilled workers and unskilled workers. Skilled workers are supposed
to be freely mobile across cities, while unskilled workers are city specic. It is also supposed
that both kinds of workers are used both in production and R&D and that they are imperfect
substitutes.32
In this dierent setting specialization happens at the cost of growing wages both for mobile
and immobile workers. Suppose that a new quality is discovered in the city: a new leader takes
the world demand for that good at the expenses of the former leader which is located abroad.
The latter releases both mobile and immobile labor. The innovator attracts immobile workers by
bidding in the local market, mobile workers by bidding in the world market. Bidding in the local
labor market pushes immobile workers wages upward to a larger extent than in the international
markets where workers are released from the former leader. Since the new leader can partially
substitute mobile and immobile workers, wages of both are in the end pushed upward by the
same extent, and research becomes more expensive. The consequences are the same as in the
main model, but i) wage revisions are dampened by the presence of a mobile resource; ii) by a
general equilibrium consideration wage is pushed upward in both locations (abroad the mobile
factor has to be paid a higher wage, therefore it is substituted away with immobile labor, whose
price is pushed upward); iii) volatility in the labor markets for both factors in both cities is
dampened by the possibility to substitute the relatively more expensive factor with the cheaper
one.
The last result depends crucially on the elasticity of substitution among the factors. If
mobile and immobile workers are perfect substitutes, it is as if only one kind of labor is used,
and specialization plays no role, since the supply of mobile workers is not scarce. If mobile and
immobile labor are not substitutes at all (think of a Leontief's production function), volatility
increases only in the market for the immobile factor. In this case only the immobile factor
enjoys the city as a diversication device, the mobile factor being indierent between settling in
a specialized or diversied city.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper shows a mechanism through which the absence of diversication in R&D technology
induces correlated product life cycles in dierent sectors. Such a comovement has two implica-
tions. On the one hand, city life cycle is tightly linked with these comoving product life cycles,
whose 
uctuations are large and depend on competition of the markets for nal goods. On the
other hand, during booms the general equilibrium eect of the increased demand for labor drives
32Dierent modeling choices imply sharply dierent results. If mobile workers are only used in R&D, and
immobile workers are only used in production, specialization drives up immobile workers wage, but at the same
time does not discourage research. Specialization ceases to be harmful for R&D and future competitiveness of
the city.
22wages upward, discouraging R&D and undermining future competitiveness of the city.
Diversication in R&D technology across sectors |which unchains the life cycle of the city
from the product life cycle of the activities performed within the city, since aggregate output
does not comove with sectoral output| reduces volatility of employment and wages. General
equilibrium eects of higher demand on the local labor market are dampened, the eort locally
exerted in R&D is higher, and city output grows through less volatile cycles.
Such a trade-o between diversication and business cycle 
uctuations is in
uenced by two
features of the model, namely pecuniary externality and learning by doing. The pecuniary exter-
nality which arises in the model once expenditure is made endogenous, is shown to exacerbate
the above mentioned trade-o: the adjustment toward equilibrium after a new innovation is
accompanied by higher wage pressure and higher employment volatility the stronger the pecu-
niary externalities. Conversely, learning by doing and the possibility to accumulate knowledge
over time make the trade-o less tight. Learning by doing compensates the negative eect of
competition in the local labor market on the incentives to perform R&D.
Two further issues are left out of the analysis: the eect of allowing mobility of the labor
force (migration) and the consideration of a complete market for capital. Migration would allow
a reduction in the negative eects of increased demand in the local labor market, because local
labor supply would not be bounded from above, except in the very short period. This feature
would then work in the direction of weakening the trade-o between the absence of diversication
and incentive to perform R&D, output growth and employment. This is a standard result indeed:
human capital 
ows play the role of an income smoothing device, like a complete market for
asset and cross- ownership would do. This latter would introduce a more reliable and easier
device to insure against boosts in the city life cycle. Inhabitants of a city would be able to share
risk by just detaining shares in activities performed outside the city. Given the structure of
the competition in the market for goods (there is only one winner of the technological race in
each sector), those shares would represent a perfect contingent claim. Absence of diversication
would not be harmful anymore, in that it would still reduce competitiveness inside the city, but
without the negative consequences on the level of local expenditure which are peculiar to the
model developed in the paper.
Appendix
A1 Proof of existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium
Existence
One way to verify that the equilibrium exists is to compare X(w) and  L   (w) at w = w0




  L   (w0) (33)
X(w0) = 

(   1)(1   )
  L: (34)
To obtain the latter recall that at w = w0 prots as well as employment in R&D are nil.33
The rst condition amounts to require that at the minimum wage labor demand exceeds
labor supply. By the denition of w0 in footnote 11, when no production occurs in the city (i.e.
33Also notice that X(w0) is limited from above at ( +  L)=(   1 + ) since employment in production
in the city is at most  L.
23 = 0)  L = (w0), implying that X(w0)   L   (w0) for any  2 [0;1].
The second condition requires that at the maximum wage there are in the city enough workers
to satisfy world demand for the bundle of production goods produced in the city. Should the
latter not be the case, since the price of the top quality cannot exceed w0 without diverting
demand to the second highest quality, production of such goods in the city would therefore
satisfy world demand up to  L, with the remaining world demand =(   1)(1   )    L being
satised by rms outside the city producing the second-best-quality at the limit price w0.
Hence, X(w) exceeds  L (w) at w = w0, while the former is at least as large as the latter
at w = w0, implying that the two schedule cross at least once in [w0;w0]. This establishes
the existence of an odd number of equilibria in the admissible wage range.
Uniqueness
Before giving the formal proof of uniqueness in the case of a logarithmic R&D technology, it
is instructive to examine the reason why in the general case it is hard to evaluate the slope of
demand for labor in production with respect to wages.
An increase (decrease) of wages diminishes (increases) demand for researchers, and |owing
to the pecuniary externality| commands a higher demand for goods, and therefore for man-
ufacturing workers who produce them. In turn each manufacturer is paid a higher wage and
demands more goods. All in all, potentially, the increased demand for manufacturing workers
may outweigh the reduction in the demand for researchers. If this is the case, the increase in
wages initially meant to reduce labor demand ends up increasing it. On the opposite, wages
decrease if upward wage pressure reduces demand for researchers more than it increases demand
for manufacturers.
The intuition of such a mechanism is easily got by observing that the derivative of labor















The rst term in brackets represents a kind of wealth eect of the increase of wages on the
demand of production goods by R&D workers: keeping R&D employment constant, expendi-
ture by R&D workers increases along with their payroll, and the increased demand for goods
commands a higher demand for production workers. The second term represents a sort of sub-
stitution eect of the wage increase on the demand of goods by R&D workers: according to
equation (37), a wage increase induces a shrink in the R&D employment, thus for constant wage
the demand for goods by R&D workers decreases, thus commanding a lower demand for produc-
tion workers. The third term represents a multiplier eect: higher wages increase expenditure
on production workers, thus commanding an higher demand for goods which has to be met by
an increase of employment in production.
Intuitively, for the demand for production workers to decrease due to a wage increase, the
demand for R&D workers has to decrease much more then proportionally than the wage increase.
Should this be the case, the substitution eect would more than compensate the wealth eect
and the multiplier eect, and excess demand of labor would be re-equilibrated via wage changes.
Moving to a logarithmic R&D technology, the obvious advantage of such functional form is
that the wealth eect and the substitution eect in (35) cancel out, thus leaving the slope of
labor demand in manufacturing be determined by the only multiplier eect.









0 1=(wVij)didj; the rst and the second term in (35) cancel out, implying that the sign
24of the partial derivative of the demand for labor in production depends on the sole sign of the
multiplier eect, which is always positive.
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= 22 w + w0
[(   1 + )w0   w]3 > 0: (36)
Hence demand for workers in production is a monotonically increasing function of the wage level.
Turning to (w), () = 1= can be replaced into (22), so that the equilibrium level of
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:
It is easy to show that the employment in research decreases as wage increases, and that the























[(   1 + )w0   w]2didj < 0 (37)
where C = (   1)(1   )(1 + w0Vij)w0 > 0.34
The sign of the second derivative of employment in research with respect to wage depends
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34The derivative of Vij and  j with respect to w do not need to be considered as an application of the envelope
theorem.
25Demand for researchers turns out to be concave (and the schedule  L (w) convex) for w < ^ w
where
^ w =
2(   1 + )   (   1)(1   )(1 + w0V )
22 w0:
Obviously ^ w does not need to lie within the admissible wage range, therefore three cases should
be distinguished: i) if w0 < (2A   1)=(V ) than ^ w > w0, therefore it is always w < ^ w and
 L   (w) is convex; ii) if (2A   1) < w0 < (2A    + 1)=[(V )(1   )] than ^ w 2 [w0;w0]
and  L   (w) is S-shaped, namely convex for w < ^ w and concave otherwise ; nally iii) if
w0 > (2A    + 1)=[(V )(1   )], then ^ w < w0, therefore w > ^ w and  L   (w) is always
concave.
In each of the three cases, however, X(w) and  L (w) have one and only one cross-point,
and the equilibrium is unique.
A2 Employment in research and production when the  increases
Lemma 1
When  increases, employment in R&D and demand in manufacturing increase.
Proof of the lemma 1




(w0   w)(w + w0)(w   w0)
[(   1 + )w0   w]2 > 0
Recalling gure 1, The  locus stays put, while the VV locus turns counterclockwise around
the intercept. The new equilibrium in the market for patents occurs at an higher employment
in research and an higher value of the patent (V decreases, v increases).
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A3 The relation between average correlation among sectors and the variance
of 
Let corr(ZijZsn) in equation (9) be written as a function of (ij;sn),  (ij;sn) and let the










26since ij and sn are iid (which also implies that cov(ij;sn = 0)). Consider the second order
Taylor approximation of  (ij;sn) in a neighborhood of E() =  ,
 (ij;sn) '  ( ;  ) + r ( ;  )0[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sn    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2
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where   =
R R
(ij)didj, ( ) =
 2
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2 +  
> 0, D( ) =
  
( 2 +  )2 > 0, K( ) =
3 22 
( 2 +  )3 > 0.
Hence,











( 2 +  )2 > 0.
Finally, notice that the third order Taylor approximation delivers a positive dependence between
the average pairwise correlation  (Z) and the skewness of the distribution of the 's through
the coecient G( ) =
 2(4 2 +  ) 
( 2 +  )4 > 0, while the fourth order approximation establishes a
negative correlation with the kurtosis, through the coecient M( ) =
5 3 (3    4 )
4( 2 +  )5 < 0.
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